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CAMOTIVATED MARKETS: Instruments and Ideologiesof Clean Energy in the United Kingdom
JOSHUA RENO
Goldsmiths College, University of London
“Green” or “natural” capitalism (Foster 2002; Hawken et al. 1999; Kovel 1999)
is typically concerned with the reconciliation of ecological and economic values.
By green capitalism, I refer to forms of political economy that seek to appropriate
the reproductive potential of biomaterials or to nurture and sustain such potential
or both (see Hayden 2003; Helmreich 2008; Rajan 2006; Sodikoff 2007). These
aims are typically thought to be troubled in one of two ways: either by the difficulty
(if not the impossibility) of establishing metrics to adequately account for the
“true value” of nature, or by what Marxian ecologists refer to as a metabolic rift that
progressively divides capitalist industry and labor from the nonhuman environment
on which they depend (see Clark and York 2005; Foster 2000; O’Connor 1997).
In this article, I explore market devices that are meant to establish such metrics and
bridge such rifts through the promotion of renewable energy as a commercially
viable substitute for fossil fuels.
Efforts to promote “clean energy economies” are founded on the belief that
capitalism should be motivated by the real limitations and possibilities of the earth,
not by the exchange of purportedly abstract or fictitious representations of value.1
Those committed to the pursuit of clean energy seek to plan economies around
resources that avoid the grave social and environmental costs of fossil fuels. Unlike
the planet’s vanishing oil reserves, sunlight, wind, and waves are relatively plentiful,
regenerate quickly, and when exploited typically have a reduced ecological impact.
For this reason, the promotion of renewable energy is increasingly part of the policy
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agendas of industrial nations and environmental groups, fostered by experiments
at once technical, economic, and governmental.
To grapple with these ongoing efforts of social transformation, I focus on the
Renewables Obligation (RO) of England and Wales, which involves the creation of a
government-sponsored market in virtual “renewability” to subsidize the production
of renewable energy and generate demand for it. Although there are many ways
of accomplishing these goals, Euro-American economists and government officials
tend to favor polices that utilize financial incentives. Like markets in carbon offsets,
renewable energy policy in the United Kingdom is a form of neoliberal governance;
rather than merely force compliance it seeks to motivate individuals through
financial incentives. Such policies rely on assumptions about how individuals can
be motivated to act in accordance with policy directives. Economic interests, it is
thought, can be harnessed as a political mechanism to bolster green virtues; the
assumption being that the actors in question possess a desire for wealth that can be
channeled into reform: Homo economicus and Homo ecologicus are made one through
market design.
According to the material sociology of finance, broadly associated with the
work of Michel Callon (1998, 2009) and Donald MacKenzie (2009) among others,
individual actors in a market can approximate the “economically rational” self-
interest described by economists with the help of the various technical devices they
have at their disposal. A person at a grocery store, for example, is not alone, but
may be accompanied by an itemized list, a calculator, coupons, signs advertizing
special deals, price tags, a receipt, and so on. “Interests are not given,” writes
MacKenzie, “they are calculated” as part of larger sociotechnical arrangements of
persons and an assortment of market devices (2009:25). I discuss the relation-
ship between participants in the United Kingdom’s renewable energy sector and
different environmental and economic devices that facilitate their actions, focus-
ing in particular on the different ways market devices channel environmental and
economic motivations as well as reshape them into new and potentially alienating
forms.
I examine the RO primarily from the perspective of small-scale generators,
who make up nearly two-thirds of the renewable energy facilities in the United
Kingdom, but are responsible for less than one percent of renewable energy pro-
duced (Ofgem 2009:37). I begin by discussing the beginnings of the renewable
energy sector among U.K. farmers and the transformations brought about through
market-based policies. I focus on farmers, in particular, because their experi-
ences illustrate the complex intentions associated with making the environmental
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economic. In the United Kingdom, farms and farm animals have recently served as
critical sites for the representation and governance of the most pressing environ-
mental issues, including genetic engineering (GM crops, cloning), climate change
(methane emissions), and global pandemics (bovine spongiform encephalopathy,
foot-and-mouth disease). For some, waste-to-energy digesters promise to trans-
form a dangerous pollutant (animal wastes) into an environmental good (renewable
energy) at a time when both environmental credibility and economic security are
increasingly uncertain.
I demonstrate that renewable energy producers, including U.K. farmers and
energy suppliers and traders, participate in the market in renewables in ways that
are out of sync with the predictions of policymakers. To explain the significance
of green certificates for RO participants, I draw on the notion of social payment
(Guyer 2004; Maurer 2007), which highlights the variety of ways that these virtual
commodities are accounted for, whether as forms of wealth, moral currency,
regulatory obligation, or risk.
Although participants in the renewable market demonstrate a wide variety
of economic actions and motivations, market devices record their transactions
as examples of “competitive exchange” and “self-interest,” thereby reproducing
authoritative facts about the market in accordance with neoliberal accounts. Con-
temporary tools of economic reflection and intervention emerged in the early 20th
century alongside the increasing dependency of capitalist democracy on fossil fuels
(Mitchell 2009:416). Therefore it is not only the effects of economic reforms, but
also their translation into economic expertise that requires analysis.
Following Timothy Mitchell (2005) and Webb Keane (2008), I emphasize
the role of market devices, especially renewable energy meters and auctions, in
furthering neoliberal models of the economic, as well as providing a means of
contesting them. Such devices not only help market participants calculate their
interests and make economic decisions, as Callon and MacKenzie suggest, they
also make the motivations of those participants calculable as objects of economic
knowledge. The economic “facts” that result, I argue, frame economic action in a
narrow way that shapes the reflections of renewable policy experts as well as their
critics.
My goal in this article is not to advocate a particular method of energy reform.
Rather, I want to explore the means by which green markets are thought possible—
and by extension, new forms of capitalism—as well as the implications this has for
the economic as a form of expert knowledge and social practice. In the conclusion, I
discuss the significance of models of the person in the creation of renewable energy
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and climate change policies more broadly, arguing for more appreciation of the
importance of uncertainty, ambivalence, and the incongruities of social action.
GROWING AND GOVERNING ENERGY
In summer 2008, I toured the U.K. countryside with James Murcott,2 an
expert on anaerobic digestion or “digesters,” visiting some of the 35 facilities he had
helped develop. “Fossil-fuel farming is a dead-end road,” he told me, and abandoning
this path does not mean devoting farms to a new purpose—planting “energy crops”
to create biofuel, for instance—but recognizing the untapped potential of their
wastes. Designs vary, but typically digesters involve a vessel into which various
biomaterials are pumped, after which they are mixed together and broken down
to form two substances: a fertilizer high in nitrogen and methane, a combustible
biogas.
For Murcott, such technology realizes a dream of improved agriculture: “[It]
gives you energy as a by-product, but it gives you odor control, it gives you
better nutrient management. When you take the carbon out of the waste stream,
you are making the nutrients more available for fertilizer.” Like others, Murcott
became interested in renewables during the energy crisis of 1973–74, “We had a
flood of books, people that set about gathering information that would help us.
There were books about wind energy, solar, and a little on digesters.” Murcott
preferred the reliability of digesters: “The wind blowing, the sun shining, tends
to be unpredictable; that pile of muck in the yard is very predictable.” Following
examples from India and China, he built a prototype “baby digester” for his father-
in-law’s chicken farm, a 2m3 unit just big enough to produce gas for cooking.
In the mid-1970s, Murcott formed a company with his wife’s cousin that
would become the primary digester supplier in the United Kingdom. He later
formed a different company to focus exclusively on farm digesters, with the
assistance of the U.K. Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fish (MAFF), which
distributed digester grants to encourage rural diversification. One of his clients
was Phillip Nelson, a Welsh farmer who wanted a digester to heat his houses and
dairy operation, improve his fertilizer, and reduce his dependence on fossil fuels.
A small agricultural university used a large digester for their livestock. Another
Welshman used the technology to “go organic” to improve the quality of his cheese
(see Figure 1). Murcott’s plants were still running as many as two decades later.
But the political landscape of renewables was changing. In the mid-1990s,
MAFF stopped its grant program and another company with controlling inter-
est liquidated Murcott’s digester business. The grants had been replaced with a
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FIGURE 1. A biological digester designed by James Murcott.
market-based program to encourage the production of renewable energy for sale.
In 1990, the conservative government decided to subsidize renewables (particularly
nuclear power) as part of its bid to privatize the energy sector (Mitchell 2000:286).
Europe’s first such initiative, this initial policy was managed like a competitive
grant: the government would order a specific quantity of renewable energy, and
then select the lowest bidders for different technology “bands” (e.g., wind, solar,
etc.). Regional electricity companies were obliged to purchase all the renewable
energy projects in their area at a premium price. Suppliers were obliged to purchase
all the energy from projects awarded grants.
As concerns about climate change and energy security mounted among in-
terest groups throughout Europe, more procurement schemes emerged. Prior to
the deregulation of EU energy markets, the policy most often implemented by
European governments was some variation of feed-in tariff (FIT), such as Germany
introduced in 1991. Like the initial U.K. plan, FIT obliges regional suppliers to buy
from renewable generators at a fixed price but makes this available to any generator
and has no quota (Ringel 2006:6). Although costly, FIT proved more successful at
393
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procurement—by 2003 FIT was responsible for at least 84 percent of the power
generated from wind in the European Union (Meyer and Koefoed 2003:598).
For these and other reasons, in 2001 the U.K. New Labour government
introduced the Renewables Obligation. The RO retained quota obligations, as well
as competition: energy suppliers were obliged to invest in a growing number of
renewables annually (specified as a specific fraction of their total energy output) or
pay a “buyout fee” for every megawatt hour (MWh) they fell below their obligation.
Fulfillment of this obligation is demonstrated by purchasing Renewables Obligation
Certificates (or ROCs). Each green certificate or credit is a virtual representation
of one MWh of renewable electricity generated in the United Kingdom. From
this demand for renewable credits arises a supplementary market, which provides
a separate income to generators for the virtual “renewability” of the energy they
produce (see Figure 2).
The complex value of ROCs adds a further “gaming” element to encourage
suppliers to exceed their obligation (Mitchell et al. 2006:300). At the end of every
obligation period, money from the buyout fund (collected from all those who
failed to meet their full quota) is “recycled” back into the value of each accumulated
renewability credit, thus ideally rewarding suppliers who overachieve in producing
or buying green energy at the expense of others.
In 2008, for example, the obligation was for 7.9 percent of energy supplied
in England and Wales to be from renewables (22 million MWh), increased from
FIGURE 2. The market in ROCs.
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6.7 percent in 2007. Thirty energy suppliers turned over 14.5 million ROCs to
the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), satisfying roughly 64 percent
of the total obligation, which meant that the buyout fund from noncompliance was
high (more than £280 million) and the ultimate value of each credit increased to
£52.95. Because there is more financial incentive to exceed the obligation than to
pay the buyout, ROCs are thought to encourage further renewable investment.
The RO diagrammed above serves as a model of moral accountability. As with
the conservative government’s plan, energy supply companies are held directly re-
sponsible by the government for financing a clean energy economy. A renewability
credit serves as a record of who has contributed what amount to the growth of clean
energy.3 Other social exclusions become apparent at the technical level. Renewable
projects can only earn ROCs if they seem viable enough to attract sufficient outside
funding and progress through the difficult planning phase. For this reason, more
established companies in Western and Northern Europe are increasingly attracted
to the United Kingdom, where they can successfully compete for contracts.
The digesters that are now built on U.K. farms reflect a change from 20 years
ago, indicating that market-based approaches are reshaping motivations from con-
sumption to production of energy. New plants tend to rely on German technology
more than Murcott’s designs. Alan Sloan’s digester is one example. He sought out
a German partner to demonstrate and distribute digester technology from his farm
in Dorset. With its backing, he installed a 2,800m3 digester to process his corn
and cow slurry into renewable energy and credits. Even some of Murcott’s former
clients have decided to sell gas. Nelson, one of the Welsh farmers introduced
above, invested in an innovative three-stage digester, also of German origin and
built around the plant Murcott installed, primarily to enhance energy production
for ROCs.
Through market-based initiatives, an alternative model of renewability focused
on the farm as an organic process is losing favor to one focused on the development
of new sources of energy for the national grid. Murcott’s approach to digesters
tends to emphasize saving rather than producing energy. Digesters, he argues, should
mimic the economical makeup of animal bodies:
Are you familiar with a cow? A cow plucks the grass using its tongue and puts
it into its first stomach, where it undergoes biological breakdown. It doesn’t
chew it. It then sits on the ground and ruminates, which means it regurgitates
its food and macerates. So it macerates it after the first stage of digestion, and
that means it takes less energy for the maceration stage. A chicken eats its food
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whole and has a macerator in its gizzard that actually helps it to break down
its food internally. . . . And you can apply all of these things to your digester
design. . . . I think you’ll find that pre-digestion is going to become a more
preferred way of doing things. It requires less energy.
According to this model, farm production and energy generation from waste
ought to be integrated as if part of a living organism. For Murcott, this began
as a way to adapt Indian designs to a cooler environment; to address the heating
and mixing demands of U.K. farms, gas is circulated back into the digester to
drive the mechanical maceration of material. Similarly, excess gas is pumped into
the farmhouse to be used for cooking and heating, because that is seen to be more
energy efficient than pumping it into a grid to contribute to the nation’s renewable
quotas.
The digesters based on German designs represent a different approach, which
interrupts the recycling of energy back into the farm. After Sloan’s digester was
fully commissioned, it could not send power to the grid or register ROCs because
the tank was too acidic, threatening the engine with corrosion. Until a neutralizing
base could be added, Sloan was losing money on an “insecure” product from the
standpoint of energy production, although it was perfectly usable as a source of
heat. But Sloan didn’t finance his digestor for heat. Neither did the Welsh farmer
Nelson; in his new German digester, where gas had once been channeled to a boiler,
heat exchangers now draw waste heat from the engine as it converts methane into
electricity. This way the ROC meter registers as much gas as possible, while heat
use is subordinated to the generation of electricity.
In some ways, this shift to production for the grid introduces new forms of
alienation that can interrupt daily life on the farm as well. For energy to be traded,
whether as a commodity or credit, generators need to be connected to energy
consumers drawing from the national grid. Rural digesters are typically too small
to connect to the grid the normal way; instead, they must transmit energy through
the distribution network. But network connection is not so simple. In Sloan’s case,
the local water board identified the location of a water main incorrectly, and a pipe
was mistakenly ruptured, shutting off water to 44 homes and four farms for several
hours.
Other tensions arise through the technology, showing its ability to frustrate
some of the agricultural values that Murcott’s more organic design was meant to
realize. It is evident that reorienting the digester toward energy production has
changed Nelson’s farm in Wales, and not entirely to his liking. During my tour,
396
MOTIVATED MARKETS
he moved freely through every area, around cows and through gates, excitedly
explaining his plans to digest hay with slurry, pointing out what equipment needed
replacing or describing the gas potential of chicken litter. But toward the end of the
visit, at the farm’s edge, Nelson stopped to complain that he was forbidden from
entering the locked, fenced-off shack where the electrical transformers connect to
the grid. Connecting to the distribution network meant inviting an alien structure
into an intimate space, enclosed to “protect” him from the high voltage generated
from his own animals, creating a spatial analogue to the conversion of his biogas
into an alienable product.
Nelson’s farm has borne witness to the shift in the U.K. from renewable
energy as farm management to renewability as a tradable commodity. For Sloan
and his newly built digester, establishing connections to the grid is an opportunity
to prove the value of digesters to his neighbors—some of whom remember well
his past interest in GM crops. When I visited his plant, one of the pipelines was
left uncommitted so that it might one day provide free gas to the community. As
will be discussed in the next section, revaluing energy through market instruments
like ROCs does not foreclose investment in the moral and material improvement
of farms, even as it reshapes how they can be accounted for.
ACCOUNTING FOR ROCS
Countless anthropological studies have challenged the characterization of fi-
nancial instruments (wages, taxes, bonds, derivatives, etc.) as merely asocial forces
of pure rationalization and commodification (Bloch and Parry 1989; Lemon 1998;
Akin and Robbins 1999; Maurer 2005). In the United Kingdom, ROCs coexist with
a multiplicity of social actions and motivations, interests and responsibilities. As
the British countryside endures profound change, farming involves wider debates
that implicate not only plants and animals, family and neighbors, but regulators
and the global food trade. The anticipation of green credits recasts decisions about
the management of farms in a variety of ways, revealing the complex motives out
of which the emergent renewability market is derived, as well as conceptions of
the economic more broadly.
Following the work of Jane Guyer (2004), Bill Maurer argues that some
forms of financial action, which he calls “social payments,” fall outside the sphere of
exchange altogether: “[A] vast number of things financial . . . stand aside from the
quantitative machinery that many have taken to be capitalism’s hallmark. Rather,
they involve payments, efforts to avoid payments, the consequences of those
efforts, and the creation and manipulation of debt” (2007:127). Such payments
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are more broadly “social” because they involve a debt relationship and the creative
hesitations and manipulations this can entail. David Graeber (2011) points out
that debt cannot be reduced to relations of exchange or reciprocity, but in its
purest expression coincides with relations of hierarchy. Taxes, for example, are
not about an exchange between equal partners, but about a political subject giving
an obligatory payment, one that cannot be finally repaid during one’s lifetime. And
yet, this obligation can be deferred and manipulated; there are tax “write offs,”
“evasions,” and “cheats.” I draw on Maurer and Graeber as a reminder that financial
instruments are about more than actively desired and accumulated forms of wealth,
but ambivalently accounted for and negotiated payments.
ROCs, like connections to the national grid, offer new ways of calculating
for the day-to-day business of farm management. Nelson claims “environmental”
concerns as the primary reason he renovated the original digester Murcott designed.
He expressed anxiety about climate change: “If we mess up the climate, there’ll
be no hiding place—we’re all in this together.” In this sense, ROCs stand for
environmental responsibility. In the same way, “carbon” is not only tradable as
a commodity but increasingly works as a form of moral currency in ecological
discourse, a way of accounting that stands in for one’s willingness to do something
about environmental degradation. Nelson’s sense of environmental care through
digester technology is not only about moral accounting but practical management
of the farm, as he puts it “getting better use of the fertilizer value of those manures.”
The best evidence of environmental impact, from his perspective, is that he’s “never
had such thick and strong grass” as he is getting from the fertilizer spread on his
fields. ROCs were meant to enable this further integration of farm and digester.
Unlike the Murcott design, new German digesters force farmers to consider
their financial circumstances more carefully. Nelson claims he was “a bit blind” in
his pursuit of ROCs at first, with only a rough idea of what to expect regarding
costs and financial returns. If so, this seems to have changed over time. When I
last spoke with him, Nelson had lost an estimated £70,000 because of a technical
difficulty establishing proper electrical balance between his generator and the
grid. He has also found it challenging to find a good price for the food waste
they buy, which is not only a good additive to the digester but a popular source
of pet food. Nelson’s biggest concern, however, is what he was offered for his
ROCs—4.5 p per kWh, which has declined a further 0.9 p with falling energy
prices. Even doubled, this is far less than he anticipated.
Yet, Nelson showed little interest in selling his ROCs for potentially higher
value on the open market or at auction, in keeping with the government’s incentive
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program and its presumption of self-interested subjects. When I mentioned the
possibility in response to his financial woes, he shrugged, as if it were the sacrifice he
was making that he was invested in or thought more worth discussing with a social
scientist. This sense of sacrifice and struggle is a familiar experience for small-
scale farmers in the United Kingdom, whose way of life is sustained by grants,
loans, and subsidies season to season. Like Nelson’s experiences with ROCs,
these various social payments by no means constitute a comfortable relationship
with the state. In the aftermath of recent epidemics affecting livestock and the
2004 ban on foxhunting,4 a level of mistrust has permeated farming communities
concerning government oversight. As competition with foreign producers grows,
efforts to convince the government and general public that domestic farming is
worth supporting have taken the form of collective action, as when pig farmers
picketed Parliament to raise awareness of their economic difficulties in 2008.
Similar to pig farmers, dairy farmers like the Nelsons have faced financial
pressure from more cheaply produced agricultural goods abroad. At best, it is
thought, digesters and ROCs should contribute to their continued survival within
this competitive climate. Nelson now suspects ROCs no longer can, and he wants
to switch to the United Kingdom’s new tariff program, introduced in 2009 for
smaller generators, which obliges suppliers to purchase renewable energy at a
fixed rate of 11.5 p per kWh. Although the new law allows midsize generators
(between 50 kWh and 5 MWh) to transfer from ROCs to FITs as well, this does
not apply if generators are locked into a contract, as are the Nelsons’. Nelson
blames Ofgem, in part, for its ineffectiveness and has been asking his members of
Parliament to change the rules. For him, ROCs are like a bad grant that should
be replaced with a new one, precisely because they are thought of as a means to
secure a valuable way of life, one that is important to the government as well as to
families.
Sloan has his own methods of accounting for AD and ROCs. Always interested
in promoting his farm, he appears in a YouTube video at a European climate change
conference in 2009. In the clip, a succinct introduction to his digester reveals a
different position from Nelson’s:
The economics, I guess, is the principal reason we actually undertook the
venture. . . . The output of the plant is 370 kWh, and we look to run that for
8,000 hours a year, so with a current rate that’s available to us in the UK of
14.5 pence per kWh, or 17 eurocents, we’re looking to turn over 422,000
of electrical income per year.
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Yet, his next statement echoes that of his Welsh counterpart: “it was a way to add
value to the produce we grow on the farm.”
Some of the spin-off benefits that have come out from [the digester] have
been the fact that the digestate that comes out . . . has a much higher nitrogen
value . . . it also doesn’t smell . . . so we don’t get rejection problems with
cattle feeding behind it, so that’s enabled us to make a saving of 60 to 70
percent on our imported nitrogen fertilizer, which means a direct cash saving.
Like Nelson, Sloan’s estimation of “value” is part of a method of accounting that
sees the farm as a total process of growth and transformation. But for him, this
involves more precise calculations of energy and cash gained and lost.
Ultimately, the main purpose of his digester is to serve as a showcase for his
German technology. This shapes Sloan’s view of ROCs, which he sees not as assets
but, rather, as risks to be managed carefully. The problem, he suggested to me, is
that farmers tend to be risk averse:
Farmers are bloody conditioned to getting grants. So you can tell people how
much return on investment they’ll make, because of the double ROC, and
then the next person will say, “Are there are any grants?” And I said, “Say I
give you a 15 to 20 percent return on your investment, how much more do
you want?” It’s a green premium, which is only 15 percent of the price you
get, that’s where the incentive is. [Imitates a rural farmer.] “Well, I’d rather
have 40 percent up front and a lower price at the end,” because they just see
it as derisking it. They see it as someone else’s job to take the risk.
Taking the risk here means taking the ROCs. Sloan often tells prospective clients
that they should disregard double ROCs from their estimates altogether, to avoid
confusing risk for reward but also as a hedge against potential policy changes. Like
Nelson, his position on ROCs has only become more ambivalent with the release
of the new FIT law. This is because the value of ROCs is not set within the market
but is further mediated by competing regulatory incentives.
It is perhaps for these reasons—relational interpretations of ROCs as grants
given, risks shared, or policies enforced—that small-scale generators subject to the
RO are more likely to accept long-term contracts, or power purchase agreements,
that bundle their green certificates with electricity, in effect providing the value of
the ROC up front and offloading risk and reward to the energy supplier. As Sloan
indicates, it is not simply about eliminating risk but maintaining familiar forms of
obligation. A grant up front (which many are likely to have depended on in the
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past) serves as a familiar and dependable social payment, a fee for working in an
undeveloped but important sector.
Although it may be that small generators are more attuned to the kinds
of accounting I have described thus far, the social payments or debt-relations
occasioned by participation in the ROC market are similar for large renewable
generators and energy suppliers. Most have tended to hoard renewable credits,
rather than trading in large volumes as expected (Mitchell et al. 2006:302). Cara,
a renewable energy broker, described this to me as another accounting maneuver.
It is why, for instance, her company convenes its ROC auction on a monthly basis,
allowing suppliers to adjust their approach to the RO throughout the year. Because
many suppliers own their own renewable generators, they too are vulnerable to
planning and technical difficulties. As Cara put it, “What happens if they’ve been
banking on getting 500,000 ROCs, a wind farm goes down, so they’re only going
to get 400,000?” At different points throughout the obligation period, companies
may seek to purchase extra ROCs quickly or to defer until the deadline, tactics
a monthly auction helps make possible. In this instance, suppliers do not see the
purchase of appreciating ROCs as an investment opportunity, as intended by the
government, but as a form of social payment they are obliged to make.
Deciding how to negotiate the ROC market takes shape in a context of
established relations between farmers, energy companies, state agencies, and banks,
encouraging the adoption of familiar accounting strategies. At the same time, it
entails new forms of obliging and manipulating social payment and debt, crystallized
around the experimental moment associated with climate change governance. In
the next section, I will explain how these various motives surrounding credits
and payments are translated by market devices into an authoritative record of
exchange, which generates economic facts for reflexive control and critique of the
ROC market.
MARKET REFLECTIONS
In 2002, the same year the RO was introduced, the EU passed the Renewables
Directive. In keeping with the pragmatic ethos of European governance, govern-
ments were made responsible for deriving a specified percentage of their energy
from renewables—without specifying how (see Barry 1993:316). Within the en-
vironmental policy communities of Euro-America, market-based certificates and
more directly subsidized tariffs have been the primary regulatory means of replac-
ing fossil fuels with renewable sources. Generally speaking, preference for tariffs
or certificates tends to overlap with a larger divide between social democratic and
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neoliberal ideologies of state action, respectively (see Toke 2005:362–63). Thus,
TGCs have been favored by the United Kingdom, the United States, and transna-
tional blocs like NAFTA’s Commission for Environmental Cooperation and the
European Commission, while Canada and much of Western Europe have tended
to favor FITs, along with groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Such
tendencies are indeed revealing, but I would suggest that they are not an ideological
given; the apparent necessity or moral appeal of any policy is enacted through the
practical technicalities of governance (see Ong 2006).
In this section I document how the moral claims of neoliberal models ac-
quire authority through their material embodiment in particular market devices. In
particular, I describe the market devices that create a digital record of ROC trans-
actions and shape the accounts of RO regulators, participants, and critics. Market
devices accomplish this by distilling economic “facts” imbued with particular visions
of what motivates individuals (self-interest) and how they act in economic situa-
tions (through competitive exchange). My approach follows Mitchell (2005) and
Keane (2008), both of whom suggest that the objectification of market ideologies
into facts and instruments renders them contestable and makes alternative market
reflections possible.
By 2001, TGC began to gain popularity in Europe. For one thing, it was
believed to be more cost efficient than FIT and to match better with the deregulation
of EU electricity markets. But certificates were also preferred because they offer
a built-in audit function. Together, green certificates represent the total mega-
wattage that is allocated to generators, traded, and eventually turned over to the
regulator by suppliers. At the generator level, this audit mechanism is embodied
by the ROC meter (see Figure 3). Each meter possesses a unique accreditation
number; as electricity is generated, it is recorded as one certificate per MWh (or
two for “emerging” technologies like digesters).
Despite their seemingly neutral numerical operation, ROC meters are central
to authoritative interpretations of the green certificate trade. ROC figures are
ultimately submitted to Ofgem, which can then compare the debits allotted to
suppliers with the credits they return at the end of each obligation period. In this
way, renewable plants distribute energy and information in parallel, providing a
mode of double-entry bookkeeping that documents actions within the renewable
sector. Mary Poovey (1998) describes the emergence of double-entry bookkeeping
in early modern Italy as not only a means of monitoring and balancing accounts
but a form of moral persuasion. Recording financial transactions in this way made
them appear undeniable and transparent, bestowing on them an aura of facticity.
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FIGURE 3. ROC meters for a digester.
Because of the epistemological significance of double-entry bookkeeping as a source
of demonstration, Poovey situates it as a precursor to the “modern fact.” The virtual
market in renewable credits is essentially a market in facts—but facts for whom?
According to Mitchell (2005), the way that “the economy” is materially and
politically formatted—that is, as a knowable thing composed of distinct monetary
exchanges—allows for the performance of expert knowledge. The RO presents
the virtual production, exchange, and return of renewable credits, like entries in
a public ledger, and the design of EU directives makes such accountability highly
desirable. Because they are equipped with numerical representations of the market
as a collection of transactions, state actors and policy experts can predicate about
the growth of the United Kingdom’s renewable sector or the RO’s ability to
meet European targets. The RO makes renewability legible, creating a pool of data
at annual intervals, giving regulators the ability to routinely audit the market (to
estimate the price per ROC, the amount of renewable energy created, the kinds
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of technologies promoted, etc.). Consequently, it also provides the flexibility to
make necessary adjustments as the EU’s target deadlines approach.
The market facts distilled from ROC meters also inform the adjustments
made by leaving out the hesitations and negotiations characteristic of certificate
circulation and facilitating the interpretation of ROCs as desirable wealth and the
motivations of market actors as competitive, self-interested exchange. It is based
on such conceptions of the economic, for example, that emerging technologies
were thought best supported by doubling the ROCs they receive.
Moreover, this interpretive frame is meant to circulate publicly, encouraging
market participants to represent their own economic action as guided by self-
interest. Initially skeptical of AD, the owner of a large composting operation in
Dorset characterized his decision making in this way: “At the end of the day, I’m a
tart. There’s the technology side of it as well, which was a bit iffy. . . . With the
advent of two ROCs, it certainly tips the balance. . . . The extra financial rewards
[make it worth the] gamble.” Poovey also suggested that double entry bookkeeping:
“generalized rule governed behavior by encouraging merchants and their agents to
reproduce in action the orderly logic of the books” (1998:11). In a similar way,
renewable certificates reproduce an interpretative frame of self-interest, a policy
instrument that translates political targets into personal desire. ROCs are a financial
promise, an anticipatory entry in an account balance that persuades people to act
as they should.
Spreading such conceptions of economic action represents a fulfillment of an
ideal element of market reflexivity that economists call “complete information,”
which holds that “players” ought to be aware of the moves and motives available
to others in the game, particularly those with whom one intends to trade. It is
partly for this reason that the facts produced by ROC meters and collected by
Ofgem are made publicly available through annual reports in print and online,
simultaneously enacting the ideal transparency of a market to its participants
and that of a government to its citizens. During the course of my research, a
number of informants suggested a popular workshop on the RO sponsored by a
consultancy in southwestern England. In fact, some addressed my questions about
their experiences by forwarding to me documents they had received during such
seminars, which offered clear diagrams outlining the circulation and valuation of
ROCs year by year. Diagrams of historical ROC activity are not only informative but
performative; they present the market as a series of precise, individual exchanges
aggregated into a complete balance sheet. In the process, they also offer moral
arguments in support of economistic decision making. Those without renewable
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investments are encouraged to make them; those with ROCs to sell are told of
the virtue of interpreting ROCs as liquid assets, whose true value might best be
realized through open auctions.5
Unlike ROCs themselves, ROC facts travel internationally, animating discus-
sions about the future of renewable energy policy. It has been alleged that green
certificates have failed to encourage sufficient investment in the U.K. renewable
sector, meaning that utility companies fall short of their obligations by a greater
amount each year (Agnolucci 2007:3349). Economic efficiency is important to
TGC initiatives: with more investment in renewable energy, more ROCs are gen-
erated and demand falls, leading to a lower overall cost per ROC and, ultimately,
lower cost to energy customers. Whereas there were enough ROCs available to
satisfy 70 percent of the RO in 2005, the number declined to 66 percent in 2007
and 64 percent in 2008 (Ofgem 2009). During that same period, the value of each
ROC (taking into account the contribution of the buyout fund) rose by nearly
18 percent.
Is someone responsible for the RO’s purported failure? For some critics, ROC
bookkeeping records the motives of market participants. A prominent argument
among some policy analysts is that energy suppliers are colluding to produce fewer
ROCs so as to miss the national target and extract more money from consumers over
a longer period, at a lower cost to themselves (Mitchell et al. 2006:302–303; Toke
2005:366). This is difficult to prove, but its appeal is certainly because of the long
history of corporate ambivalence and outright resistance to environmental reform
in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Regardless of its veracity, this argument
also relies heavily on the apparent facticity of ROC data and the assumptions about
economic action such data embodies, identifying destructive patterns visible in the
annual records as a product of greed for ROC wealth.
In some instances, auctions are another device that disentangle green certifi-
cates from the generative sites they represent and make ROC exchanges appear
further “calculated” in the process. From one perspective, auctions serve as a virtual
marketplace for ROC sellers and buyers to locate one another and, it is presumed,
find a more competitive price. In this sense, they represent a market within a mar-
ket, another register reflexively responding to and shaping the overall RO. One of
the more recent auctions, E-ROC, was created by the auditing body set up by en-
ergy supply companies to oversee the competitive grants of the United Kingdom’s
original renewable policy. Operating four times a year, E-ROC is a blind and
highly automated online auction. The site disentangles credits from generators,
reducing bundles of ROCs to a fluid “lot,” connected only to specific ROC meter
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accreditation numbers. For buyers, the whole process is reduced to an anony-
mous exchange registered on separate computer screens, suppliers outbidding one
another for a digital commodity in limited supply.
Although disembedding fragments of economic reality is an important aspect
of the material operation of online exchanges and energy meters, in actuality market
devices are capable of eliciting very different reflections on the market. In Poovey’s
account of the development of double-entry bookkeeping, settled accounts stood
for the personal integrity and general virtue of Italian merchants. A stigmatized
social class, merchants relied on bookkeeping as a way of managing impressions
of their moral personhood (Poovey 1998:55–56). Of course, in the intervening
centuries there has been a strong tendency to read “interests” as the prevailing
source of individual motivation, in place of “passions” and “virtues” (Hirschmann
1977; Pocock 1975). But accounting instruments are still capable of occasioning
alternative ideas of economic action.
An alternative ROC auction was developed by a private consulting firm I
call “ExchangeRight” with considerable renewable investments. Cara, the energy
trader introduced previously, is one of their employees. According to her, the
auction filled a noticeable gap in the RO:
How we started . . . was by building up a number of ROCs, say on a six-
monthly basis, then going to a supplier. Because the supplier wouldn’t buy
500 ROCs from [the generator]—it’s not worth their while doing all of the
admin—so we’d collect the ROCs up and then we’d sell them. But very
quickly, we went from a couple of hundred to like this [whistles] . . . and then
we suddenly realized that . . . we should be doing an auction.
To Cara, ExchangeRight is opposed to the E-ROC auction as more than just a
competitor; she questions its legality and speculates that it might tend to favor
the energy supply companies that fund it. ExchangeRight, she claims, is more
committed to making the ROC market “fair” than fluid, which is reflected by its
auction. The bidding process is handled predominantly by phone. ExchangeRight
representatives negotiate directly with top bidders to make sure they receive the
volumes they want at a price advantageous to the generators. For Cara, part of the
benefit of such a process is that all parties can be happy with their transactions.
Perhaps it is more accurate to say that, because the exchange is more personalized,
signs of “happiness” are rendered legible within the auction’s interpretive frame.
The conflict between auctioning practices, like those dividing alternative
ways of accounting for ROCs or environmental reform, reveals the heterogeneous
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influences that give shape to the market in renewability. To the extent that only some
conceptions of the market gain traction as authoritative or necessary, it is in part
because of the work accomplished by the market devices and financial instruments,
whether grid connections, green certificates, ROC meters or auctions, all of which
instantiate particular visions of the economic. But this does not foreclose alternative
visions from taking hold.
CONCLUSION
There is clearly an elective affinity between the shared desire of government
and the energy industry to make the “renewability” of energy tradable as a virtual
commodity and the explosion in power broking that arose from the deregulation
of electricity markets during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The innovation
of credit schemes for renewable energy, or carbon emissions, makes sense at
a time when new and highly profitable market forms were being derived from
energy trading and risks were operationalized into financial instruments, whether
as hedges against market loss or forecasted environmental catastrophes. Similarly,
in the face of widespread loss of faith and growing concern surrounding global
financial instruments, it is telling that the U.K. government has now introduced a
German-derived tariff scheme to supplement the RO, as if admitting the limitations
of the market-based approach.
Turning renewability and carbon into tradable commodities is meant to make
environmental goals calculable as financial incentives, bringing individual motiva-
tions in line with ecological imperatives. Keith Hart writes, “How do we bridge
the gap between a puny self and a vast, unknowable world? The answer is to scale
down the world, to scale up the self or a combination of both, so that a meaning-
ful relationship might be established between them” (2007:16). Such procedures
require scalable models of the world and of the person. Arguably, debates over
climate change science and policy have focused much more on the former. Scaling
up individual actors through economic incentives, I have argued, relies on the
assumption that selves are fundamentally driven by a desire for wealth. Thus, green
credits are not merely instruments that allow participants in the energy sector to
calculate interests; they produce and circulate representations of those participants
as self-interested, in keeping with neoliberal ideology.
The success of this ideology is evident in the reflections that predominate when
market-based policies fail to produce expected results, as when energy suppliers or
producers interpret renewable certificates as social payments. Interestingly, Donald
MacKenzie notes the same behavior among carbon traders. “Instead of treating
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a carbon market as a profit opportunity, most [treat] the new and unfamiliar
scheme . . . as a compliance matter” (2009:174–175). According to him, these
market participants still “have to be ‘taught’ to behave as economically rational
agents” (MacKenzie 2009:174–175). The problem is that, whether one is talking
about cap and trade or the Renewables Obligation, companies are accustomed
to identifying government policies as a form of negotiable obligation; a credit
might as well be a tax. Others suspect the motives of carbon emitters and energy
suppliers, whom they claim are attempting to sabotage renewable energy and carbon
reduction initiatives. However, both supporters and critics of an experimental
market rely on the economic facts generated by market devices to reflect on its
success and speculate on the beguiling motives of its participants. In this sense,
I have argued, these devices not only “teach” participants to calculate; they also
“teach” policymakers and economists to imagine participants’ motives as calculable
according to neoliberal paradigms.
What model of the person should we rely on and what forms of scaling up? I
have argued that auctions and certificates admit of multiple interpretations and could
just as easily proliferate alternative conceptions of human action and motivation. I
would argue that these must account for the uncertainty and ambivalence of those
participating in renewable energy and climate change initiatives at all levels. A
central incongruity between subjective ideals and social realities constituted the
basis for the economic histories written by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism and Albert Hirschmann (1977). Whereas Weber famously argued
that the iron cage of modern capitalism was the unintended product of Calvinist
religious practices, Hirschmann focused on early advocates for capitalism, a social
transformation that was “earnestly and fully expected to have certain effects that
then wholly fail[ed] to materialize” (1977:131). Clearly there are examples of both
unintended consequences and unrealized intentions in renewable energy and cap
and trade initiatives. But where those Weber and Hirschmann describe at the birth
of capitalism are burdened by obliviousness to the consequences of their actions, if
anything, attempting to reform capitalism in the face of environmental catastrophe
involves a burden of knowledge.
Hirozaku Miyazaki (2003), Annelise Riles (2006), and Douglas Holmes and
George Marcus (2006) all discuss the “failure of knowledge” as experienced by
those who govern and monitor economies in the aftermath of market crashes. In
such contexts, one cannot help but be aware that the most well-intentioned actions
can produce unintended consequences while the loftiest of ideals go unrealized. In
light of recent market failures and general mistrust of government, as well as the
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sheer complexity of abandoning fossil fuels or stopping climate change, it would
be difficult to find someone with complete faith in green markets, whether this is
assurance they will make a profit or that the earth will be saved.
Nelson, for one, mocks the significance of his efforts for the climate, “it’s like
urinating in the sea if you want to raise the sea level” and yet he feels compelled
to try. I think Nelson’s sentiments are widely shared among those concerned
with environmental and economic catastrophe but uncertain of what impact they
can make, not because they lack the relevant knowledge but because they know
enough to be skeptical. With climate change and renewable initiatives, one can
typically identify a sense of disavowal on the part of participants—actions are not
earnestly and fully expected to have the intended consequences but, perhaps out
of hope, passion, obligation, interest, or some other motivation, are engaged in
all the same.
I have shown how these ambivalent negotiations fall out of view because of
the operations of certain market devices. Part of the reason this abstraction is
successful is that the market seems to work irrespective of how strong or weak
the motivations of its participants are. If the market works as designed, moreover,
it may amplify their intentions even as it distorts them, building linkages with
suppliers and consumers of energy, as well as with European and global efforts
to address climate change. There may be only a few AD plants registered for
ROCs, but this has invested them with greater renown as state-certified operations
peddling virtual signs of a greater environmental purpose. This is why Sloan is
invited to international conferences where he describes his digester as “a good
step on the way to where agriculture needs to be” and why Nelson’s farm attracts
so many visitors that he has begun charging anywhere from £200 to £1,000 for
offering tours of his digester.
Green certificates may yet become something more meaningful. Thinking
more optimistically, they could represent a way of linking imperfect desires to “do
something” to broader fields of engagement than the household or marketplace.
Like more widely circulated and more trusted forms of money, green certificates
could hold the potential to bridge the impersonal and the personal (Hart 2007) in
the transformation of energy economies. But if this requires scaling up a model
of an oblivious self with simple desires, it is not likely to reflect the reality of
policy implementation on the ground. In this way, focusing on the ambivalent
actions and disavowals associated with emerging green markets poses a challenge
to the specter of Homo economicus in social theories of action. Behind the depiction
of Hirschmann’s unrealized intentions or Weber’s unintended consequences lurks
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the presumption of a desiring ego cursed with imperfect knowledge: the economic
subject ignorantly hopes for something to happen that never does, or something
they never intended to happen unexpectedly occurs. The ways in which ROCs or
carbon credits are accounted for, by contrast, reveals the significance of imperfect
desire for conducting and reflecting on economic action.
By highlighting the motivations of emerging markets I have attempted to
draw attention to the technicalities and facts associated with fantasies of a desired
reconciliation of capitalist and ecological values. In his account of bioprospecting
in the ocean, Stefan Helmreich captures a related concept with the term blue-green
capitalism, meaning “where blue stands for speculative sky-high promise and green
for a belief in biological fecundity” (2008:107). Such speculative wonder at the
possibilities of nature can just as quickly turn to sublime horror at the thought of
losing or destroying that nature—an “alternation between promise and apocalypse”
(Helmreich 2008:15). Both images are crucial in contemporary syntheses of green
capitalism—a fundamental fantasy leaving many ambivalent or frustrated while
regulators and experts seek to motivate and understand them.
ABSTRACT
This article examines efforts to reconcile capitalist and ecological values, focusing
in particular on the instruments and ideologies that pervade the United Kingdom’s
developing renewable energy sector. In keeping with neoliberal models of economic
knowledge and practice, renewable energy instruments target the motivations of indi-
viduals by using incentive programs to reach environmental policy goals. The argument
focuses especially on the way newly implemented market devices shape and represent
the motivations of energy producers, suppliers, and traders. The centerpiece of the U.K.
government’s initiative is the creation of an artificial market in renewability, bought
and sold as a virtual commodity. Although the realities of economic motivation com-
plicate the practical implementation of the renewable market, these are represented as
isolated and self-interested “exchanges” by market devices, providing policymakers and
their critics with partial yet authoritative accounts of renewable policy, premised on
narrow and contested assumptions about economic motivation and action. [markets,
STS, renewable energy, finance, climate change]
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1. Insofar as such approaches cling to a vision of a profitable and sustainable business, the perspective
from Marxian ecology could suggest that they cannot solve the contradictions between capitalism
and ecology and may deepen them even further.
2. The names of all individuals and businesses have been changed to preserve their anonymity,
with the exception of Murcott, who preferred it otherwise.
3. But there is a great deal excluded from the diagram as well. In the case of both German tariff
and U.K. quota programs, the role of consumers in subsidizing rematerialization may remain
obscure, buried within energy bills as unexplained fees.
4. Although hunting foxes with dogs in the British countryside has historically been a pursuit of
social elites, it is an established ritual among farmers and became more socially inclusive in the
late 20th century (see Milbourne 2003).
5. I was initially so taken by these arguments, in fact, that I attempted to persuade Nelson and his
wife to sell their ROCs at auction to get a better price.
Editors’ Note: Cultural Anthropology has published a number of articles on markets and economies.
See, for example, Smoki Musaraj’s “Tales from Albarado: The Materiality of Pyramid Schemes
in Postsocialist Albania” (2011), Douglas R. Holmes’s “Economy of Words” (2009), and Robert
J. Foster’s “The Work of the New Economy: Consumers, Brands, and Value Creation” (2007).
Cultural Anthropology has also published a number of articles on environmental politics, including
Thomas Pearson’s “On the Trail of the Living Modified Organisms: Environmentalism within
and against Neoliberal Order” (2009), Marina A. Welker’s “‘Corporate Security Begins in
the Community’: Mining, the Corporate Social Responsibility Industry, and Environmental
Advocacy in Indonesia” (2009), and Joseph Masco’s “Mutant Ecologies: Radioactive Life in
Post–Cold War New Mexico” (2004).
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